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Abstract  
Despite increasing concern over the potential threat from ‘forest jihad’, there has been no 
systematic attempt to assess whether such attacks are in fact taking place. Drawing on 
principles from the geospatial profiling of terrorist events, fire-risk prediction data, and 
information on jihadist convictions, this paper offers a thorough review of the evidence to 
address this question. The available information suggests that so far, jihadists have not 
attempted to attack North American or European wildlands by means of arson. Despite calls 
for ‘popular resistance terrorism’ in the jihadist literature, and the apparently low costs 
associated with this type of attack, jihadists have so far shown little appetite for ‘forest jihad’.   
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One of the clichés of terrorism studies relates to the old question of the tree that falls, unseen, 
in the forest. If an act of terrorism is not witnessed, is it really terrorism? This question is 
given more than merely philosophical substance by the fact that certain terrorist propaganda 
texts do in fact call quite clearly for forms of action which, in this paper, are described as 
‘popular resistance terrorism’. That is, destructive acts against property or even people which 
are carried out by clandestine actors, for ideological reasons which are explicitly understood 
by the perpetrators, but where the perpetrators need not make any claim of responsibility, and 
furthermore where the acts themselves are such as to resemble accidents, acts of nature, or 
common crimes. 
Popular resistance terrorism, were it to exist, would be quite different to anonymous attacks, 
where an act of violence is relatively easily classifiable as one of terrorism, but for which the 
perpetrators, for whatever reason, do not claim responsibility. Abrahms has described 
anonymous attacks as one of the fundamental puzzles facing strategic models of terrorism.
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Such strategic approaches assume that in order for militant actors to communicate with, or 
coerce their opponent into making policy concessions, the nature of the actor and their claims 
must be made clear – without an admission of responsibility, this is not possible. Operations 
made to look like accidents or sabotage not only fail to communicate the reasons for the 
attack, but also – assuming accidents are less inherently threatening than deliberate acts of 
violence – limit the psychological impact that perpetrators might achieve. Nevertheless, there 
have been calls for such acts of ‘popular resistance’ in jihadist targeting discourses, most 
notably by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, and in Inspire magazine.2 These have included proposals, for 
example, to destroy buildings by means of gas explosions in which the perpetrator is advised 
to ‘try to make the explosion look like an accident’, to torch parked cars, or to cause accidents 
by releasing oil onto the road.  
This paper is concerned with a type of action which is distinguished both by the consistency 
with which it has been incorporated into calls for jihadist action, and its ostensible plausibility 
as a method of ‘popular resistance terrorism’: the deliberate creation of forest fires.  
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Such calls by jihadist sources such as Inspire magazine have been taken seriously by certain 
authorities. Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service, has 
suggested that this type of operation might be responsible for the spate of forest fires that 
occurred across Europe in 2012. Setting out some of the more attractive features of these 
operations, he argued that such a ‘thousand cuts’ strategy “allows [Al Qa’ida] to inflict 
significant damage on the economy and morale without any serious preparation, technical 
equipment or financial losses.”3  
The question remains however: have such attacks actually become part of the jihadist 
repertoire? Although most responses to Bortnikov’s assessment of the threat of ‘forest jihad’ 
seemed to reject the idea that it has actually been put into practice,
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 to date there has been no 
systematic investigation into whether or not jihadists have been carrying out acts of sabotage 
or arson. Notwithstanding the lack of obvious evidence, and the apparently greater threat 
posed by more ‘traditional’ acts of terrorism, which preoccupy most practitioners and 
academics, the lacuna in this area also reflects the significant challenges in trying to establish 
whether such attacks are in fact taking place. As perpetrators may not claim responsibility for 
an attack, and given the range of potential operations this type of tactic could potentially 
encompass, the analyst faces the challenge of proving a substantial negative: that no such 
events were caused by jihadists. Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate that, for example, a 
fire which appears to be an accident was in fact caused deliberately, that the reasons behind 
this went beyond the merely criminal or psychological to include political motivations, and 
that these were linked to the principles and practices of the global jihad. Given these 
challenges, it is perhaps not surprising that popular resistance terrorism has been neglected as 
an area of investigation.  
Nonetheless, while determining whether or not jihadist forest fires actually have taken place 
is necessarily a difficult task, and a question that is unlikely to be answered definitively, it is 
perhaps not quite so impossible to shed light on as it might appear. Moreover, it would seem 
4 
to be a particularly promising case to investigate in relation to the wider question of the 
significance, and indeed the existence of popular resistance terrorism.  
First, while forest fires need not in principle correspond to the pure conception of popular 
resistance terrorism as defined in this paper (for example, it would be possible to start forest 
fires in such a way as to be able to make a plausible claim of responsibility), the natural 
frequency of forest fires, the diversity of their causes, and (as the paper goes on to consider) 
the difficulty of identifying these, inherently seem to lend them to this class of action. Second, 
the substantial devastation which forest fires can lead to would appear to make them attractive 
to an actor motivated to cause purely material destruction. Third, the relative ease with which 
a forest fire can be started would seem to mean that, even assuming that only a very small 
number of people or groups were so motivated, they would be able, with sufficient 
determination, to make a noticeable impact on the occurrence of forest fires overall.     
This assumption provides the methodological starting point for this paper. By closely 
examining the aetiology of large forest fires in North America and Western Europe the 
analysis which follows shall determine, as far as possible, whether or not jihadists are setting 
fires in the West. While it is not possible to achieve absolute certainty that no one has ever, 
acting on jihadist motivations, attempted to start a forest fire (indeed, two remotely possible 
cases of this are considered in the paper), it does seem possible to determine whether the 
forensic difficulties of investigating forest fires might be concealing an entire repertoire of 
hitherto unknown jihadist action. The paper concludes that there is, in fact, no evidence that 
violent jihad by forest fire is a real phenomenon in the West. The implications of this for our 
understanding of calls for such actions, and the contrast between these and the actual 
repertoire of jihadist violence in the West will then be briefly discussed.   
Pyro-Terrorism as Popular Resistance: Some Background 
Although there has been a recent increase of interest in ‘forest jihad’, the use of arson for the 
purposes of raising political issues is not new. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) has 
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reported attacks using incendiary devices since its inception, and fire has been used as a 
means of protest against ruling powers across the world for hundreds of years. Robert 
Kuhlken draws attention to, as he frames it, “settin’ the woods on fire”, as a tool of resistance 
and protest.
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 Kuhlken looks at cases as varied as peasants rebelling against land reform and 
mechanisation in Victorian England, to arson attacks by Arab and Berber populations 
protesting against French colonial efforts at land control in North Africa in the late 1800s. 
However, the country perhaps most associated with wildfire used as a tool of political 
violence is Israel. Since the 1930s, Palestinians have used fire as a tactic, perhaps most 
notably during the First Intifada, in the course of which hundreds of fires were lit, destroying 
10,000s of hectares of forest and wildlands.
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 Hamas, Fatah and Hezbollah are all reported to 
have deliberately set fires in rural areas with the aim of inflicting damage on the Israeli state.
7
 
As a consequence, the notion of an ‘arson intifada’ periodically reappears in the Israeli press.8 
Jihadist groups have also claimed responsibility for similar types of attack in Israel. Most 
recently, Ma’sadat al-Mujahideen, a group based in the Gaza Strip, has claimed responsibility 
for a number of wildfire attacks in Israel over the last three years via jihadist fora. 
Despite this recurrent use of arson as a tactic of political violence, there has been little 
systematic investigation of what has sometimes been labelled ‘pyro-terrorism’. Studies by 
Robert Baird
9
 and Nick Deshpande
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 have looked at the issue in perhaps the most detail. Via a 
number of case studies, both draw attention to the potential for jihadist use of arson, however, 
their analysis finds no conclusive proof that this is in fact taking place. Indeed, despite 
selecting their cases on the basis of their terrorism-like characteristics, both authors highlight 
the difficulty of detecting an explicitly political motive behind wildfires. Even when fires 
have been claimed by militant actors – for example in Estonia by the ‘Forest Incinerators’, a 
group protesting about a Soviet monument in the capital – Deshpande seems reluctant to label 
them acts of terrorism. Baird instead focuses more on the level of threat and associated risk 
mitigation, rather than offering a clear assessment of whether jihadists are indeed setting fires 
in the West. Similarly, Jonathan Fighel outlines the jihadist discourse on forest jihad and sets 
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it in the context of arson as a weapon used against Israel by Palestinian militants and 
Hezbollah, yet, the author offers no concrete test of whether or not arson is being used by al-
Qa’ida or its adherents.11 As such, the question remains open as to whether or not Western-
based jihadists have taken up the call to carry out forest jihad.   
The jihadist discourse on ‘forest jihad’ is relatively limited, but largely consistent. 
Publications have set out the theological underpinnings of such operations in an effort to 
establish their legitimacy, most recently in a 2012 article entitled The Ruling of Burning the 
Forests in the Land of the Kuffar Enemies, featured in Inspire,
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 although discussions on the 
legitimacy of such tactics have been circulating for a number of years on jihadist fora.
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Looking in more detail at what the jihadist literature says about this type of attack, it appears 
to have little in common with the types of operations that characterise jihadist attacks in the 
West. Popular resistance terrorism involves neither high profile, theatrical acts of terrorism 
specifically designed to cause mass casualties using explosions or martyrdom operations. Nor 
does it fit the model of ‘grassroots’ actors carrying out more discriminate acts such as the 
murder of Theo van Gogh. Were such ‘civilian resistance’ attacks to exist, they seem to 
demand the specification of a distinct type of potential operation. Based on discussion of 
popular resistance attacks in jihadist literature, it is possible to identify a number of 
characteristics by which they might be recognised:  
1. De-privileging human targets: Although the killing civilians of enemy states is 
endorsed, such deaths are perhaps best characterised as welcome ‘collateral damage’, 
as mass casualties are not the primary aim.  
2. Destruction of material targets: Such operations are defined by their aim of causing 
material and economic damage. Specified targets include forests, agricultural land, 
largely unspecified economic targets, and equally non-specific buildings. 
3. Country profile: Such operations are called for against America, Britain, Israel, 
NATO countries and, more generally, European states, but also Russia and Australia.  
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4. Tactics: Characterised by al-Suri as ‘civil resistance action’, the discourse focuses 
primarily on arson but can include acts of sabotage.  
5. ‘Low-fi’ operational profile: Such attacks would generally involve low costs, low 
sophistication and require limited preparation.  
6. Perpetrator outcome: As there is no intrinsic demand to claim responsibility for such 
attacks, the perpetrator would have a far better chance of evading capture, a 
characteristic which seems to be a particular feature of these types of operation.  
These characteristics have some puzzling features. In addition to Abrahms’ argument, that by 
failing to come forward, the perpetrators of such attacks have little opportunity to 
communicate their demands,
14
 this model fails to maximise the strategic impact of an attack. 
Although the ‘popular resistance’ model allows for targeting important sites, such as gas 
pipelines, in general, guidelines for targeting are vague. Looking in more detail at the main 
discussions of ‘forest jihad’, they suggest that the incendiary device should be placed where 
there is abundance of trees and in areas close to buildings, to capitalise on the potential to 
inflict casualties. However, there is no discussion of choosing specific sites, for example, with 
a view to impacting critical infrastructure, or key services. Rather, the call is of a more 
general kind, designed to have two main effects: economic and psychological. By burning 
forests, woodland industries and those that rely on them would be negatively affected, along 
with losses for individual homes and farms caught up in the blaze. In addition tourism may be 
impacted, and it may tie up emergency services, although these appear to be somewhat more 
peripheral benefits. Beyond this, the psychological costs are counted as important. As such, 
“spreading terror among the targeted community”15 is considered a primary aim. However, it 
would seem that in causing what could quite unproblematically be classified as an act of 
nature, or a genuine accident, the potential for generating fear is less acute than with a more 
stereotypical case of jihadist terrorism.  
The features of this type of operation present a particular challenge in ascertaining the 
prevalence and scale of such attacks. Firstly, the possibility that such operations are taking 
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place, without claims of responsibility, means the most common way of identifying whether a 
particular event constitutes an act of terrorism cannot be assumed to apply. Secondly, even if 
an individual were to take responsibility for a particular wildfire, the researcher would 
perhaps be presented with the somewhat unusual challenge of having to prove it was an act of 
terrorism. As such operations do not fit the traditional model of jihadist terrorism, any claim 
for responsibility would perhaps have to be more cogent, and have greater evidentiary weight 
to allow it to be incorporated into the jihadist repertoire by observers. If they failed in doing 
so, for example, if the authorities believed it to be a hoax, it would perhaps not be classified 
as an act of terrorism by major terrorism databases, or even by the media, making it harder for 
scholars of terrorism relying on such sources to identify it as a distinct type of operation, even 
if it were to exist.  
Moreover, looking more closely at arson, conviction rates are extremely low; in the US, it is 
estimated that only 5-7% of arsons end in conviction.
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 In the UK over the last four years, 
sanction detection rates for arson were around 14%,
17
 whilst actual conviction rates are 
generally much lower, around 5.5%.
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 Given such low conviction rates, even if a claim of 
responsibility was made, it would be necessary to demonstrate that it was actually carried out 
by jihadists, rather than, for example, constituting an effort to capitalise on a natural disaster 
or accident. There is an intriguing example of just such a case when, in January 2012, 
Ma’sadat al-Mujahideen claimed responsibility for a wildfire in Reno, America, announcing 
“a war against the US by setting the forests of Nevada ablaze”.19 Somewhat unusually in this 
case, it is possible to determine that the fire was not an act of terrorism. Very soon after it was 
extinguished, an elderly man turned himself in, admitting responsibility for causing the blaze 
by not discarding fire ashes properly.
20
 However, this is a relatively unusual case, and 
significant obstacles remain in demonstrating whether or not such operations are indeed 
taking place. To address this question, what follows looks at the characteristics of wildfires in 
the United States and Western Europe. Using principles drawn from geospatial profiling and 
9 
fire risk forecasting, the data on wildfires is examined to explore the hypothesis that forest 
jihad has moved beyond the drawing board and is being practised by jihadists in the West.  
Wildfires in the United States of America 
Looking at data on wildfires in the United States, the first thing to note is the scale of the 
issue; in 2011 alone, more than 74,000 wildfires were reported across America, burning over 
8.5 million acres.
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 To address the scope of this challenge, the research progressed through a 
series of steps. Initially a search of media reporting was undertaken to identify whether there 
had been claims that jihadists were involved in fire-setting. The data on recent large-scale 
wildfires was then examined to try and determine whether jihadists may have been 
responsible for any of them. First this was done by comparing these fires with levels of fire 
risk in the area to identify whether there were any unusual or unexpected conflagrations, and 
second, by comparing the location of the fires with areas where jihadists are known to have 
been based, drawing on conviction data for relevant offences.  
Using Lexis Nexis, a search of media output from 2007-2012 was undertaken, using 
keywords such as ‘arson’, ‘fire,’ ‘wildfire’ and ‘terrorism’ to identify reports of actions that 
might be classifiable as ‘forest jihad’. These searches provided very little usable information; 
there were comparatively few relevant articles and the quality of information was very often 
best characterised as hearsay. The most cogent example of a wildfire plot was a report that a 
detained ‘al-Qa’ida terrorist’, claimed to have been planning a spate of wildfires across 
Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.
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 The report was based on an FBI memo, which 
stated that officers were unable to establish the veracity of the detainee’s claims, and no 
further corroboration was identified through the research. As such, this did not seem to be 
sufficient evidence of a campaign of ‘forest jihad’ in America.  
Using a similar approach, media reporting was searched for evidence of jihadist involvement 
in urban fires. Not only were there relatively few accounts of non-accidental fires with a 
motivation not clearly characterised as criminal, but those which did fit this profile were 
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largely claimed by groups such as the Earth Liberation Front. Although it is not impossible 
that environmental activists and jihadists are working together, this seems unlikely. Further, 
the targets of these attacks were generally related to environmental issues, for example setting 
fire to commercial logging equipment, or GM laboratories - targets which have shown little 
appeal for jihadists to date. A search of the GTD reveals a similar picture. Figure 1 illustrates 
the number of attacks carried out in the United States using incendiary devices and their 
perpetrators from 2000-2011. As the Figure shows, the main groups responsible for these 
attacks are primarily interested in environmental issues, with a more limited number 
instigated by anti-abortion activists and neo-Nazi groups.  
- Figure 1 about here - 
In sum, although there were suggestions that jihadists may be interested in instigating 
wildfires in America, this initial search found no conclusive evidence that such ambitions 
were being put into practice. Jihadists have made no credible claims of responsibility for fires 
in America in recent years, and no substantiated accusations have been made. It therefore 
seems possible to say that the call for ‘forest jihad’ has not been taken up with a view to 
publicising and promoting al-Qa’ida or its adherent’s aims. From this starting point, the 
research turned to ascertaining whether such acts had been carried out but not claimed. That 
is, whether truly anonymous acts of popular resistance made to look like accidents were 
taking place.  
After trying to identify from the ‘bottom up’ whether there was any evidence of jihadist 
involvement in arson by searching media reporting, the research then took a ‘top down’ 
approach to see whether, of the larger fires reported since 2007, there was any evidence of 
militant involvement. As already noted, the number of smaller fires can run into the 10,000s 
per annum, hence attention focused on those fires classified as ‘significant’. Using the 
National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) database, the research looked in more 
detail at fires that had spread over 40,000 acres. Although this eliminates a large number of 
11 
fires, it has the advantage of reducing the number to a more manageable size and focuses on 
more economically and psychologically damaging fires about which there is likely to be more 
information in the public domain. Furthermore, using existing databases not only meant it 
was possible to standardise the search, it also meant it was easier to exclude those fires which 
were determined to have a natural cause, such as lightening. Having narrowed down the 
parameters in this way, the research focused on those fires classified as having human or 
unexplained causes.  
After filtering out small fires and those attributed to natural causes, a more manageable 
dataset of 51 fires over the period 2007-2011 emerged. Of these fires, 49% were attributed to 
human causes, whilst 51% were unexplained. However, it is important to note that identifying 
a clear cause for any particular incident is problematic. Very often wildfires are not 
thoroughly investigated, and there is often disagreement between sources as to what may have 
been the cause. Turning to media reporting to try and gain further insight into how these fires 
started, it was possible to rule out 11 as potential jihadist attacks. These included fires started 
by campfires where the perpetrators were identified, and previously unidentified lightning 
strikes. Of the remaining 40 fires, 18 remain unexplained, whilst 22 were classed by the 
NICC as caused by humans. Only one of these was clearly attributed to an arson attack, this 
related to a fire begun in the hills around Los Angeles in 2009, which caused widespread 
damage and took the lives of two fire fighters.
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 The ensuing homicide investigation failed to 
identify the perpetrator, and although none of the media reporting suggested there was a 
political component, this clearly does not rule out such a motivation. Little further progress 
was possible in determining a satisfactory explanation for the remaining 39 fires; media 
reporting was sparse, and the causes remain opaque. Nevertheless, although jihadist 
involvement in these fires cannot be ruled out, it is possible to say that there were no serious 
accusations of terrorist intent.  
Having exhausted official reporting and media sources, the next stage involved employing 
insights from the geospatial profiling of terrorist attacks. A recent report from START at the 
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University of Maryland, examined the geographical characteristics of terrorist events in 
America between 1972 and 2011.
24
 The report revealed that for at least some of the 
preparation period, 35% of the perpetrators were based within 30 miles of the target location, 
and 66% within 270 miles. The research concluded that whilst terrorism is generally carried 
out further away from the perpetrator’s home than is the case for ‘ordinary crime’, militant 
actors still maintain a comparatively local sphere of operations. Further, it seems jihadist 
terrorism is particularly geographically constrained; a greater proportion of jihadists lived 
within 30 miles of the target than any other type of militant actors, and carried out far more 
ancillary and preparatory activities within the same radius. In fact, 44% of all jihadist 




Drawing insights from these findings and looking again at the data on unexplained wildfires 
in the United States, the next stage of the research attempted to identify whether there was 
any relationship between human/unexplained significant fires, and areas where people who 
had been convicted for jihadist terrorism-related offences were based. Clearly, it is not 
possible to guarantee a relationship between those interested in setting fires and more 
standard forms of attack, nor is it wise to automatically assume that areas where jihadists 
were once based constitute ‘hot spots’ where other jihadists might be living. However, it does 
not seem an unacceptably tendentious premise to suggest there may be some relationship 
between areas where jihadists have been found in the past, and other kinds of jihadist activity. 
Pursuing this line of enquiry involved setting out the geographical scope of the remaining 
unattributed wildfires. This revealed that from 2007-2011, eight states experienced more than 
one major wildfire, which remain unexplained or deemed to be caused by humans: Arizona 
(2), California (8), Florida (2), Georgia (2), Idaho (2), New Mexico (4), Oklahoma (2), and 
Texas (13) whilst a further four experienced one significant wildfire: Kansas, Montana, 
Oregon and the state of Washington.  
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Examining the locations of these fires, in general, the south and west of the country 
experienced more large scale wildfires than elsewhere. Although the risk of wildfire changes 
from year to year and season to season across the United States, the data on this set of 
wildfires reflects the fact that, all things being equal, these regions are generally more prone 
to fire than other areas.
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 Texas has suffered particularly badly over the last few years, 
experiencing a total of 18 major wildfires, 13 of which remain unexplained or are believed to 
have been caused by people. The question remains, might these have been caused by 
jihadists? There seems to be evidence that a number of the fires could well be related to 
illegal activity, albeit of a non-political nature. At least two of the fires were started in areas 
known for illegal smuggling and immigration from Mexico, and although the authorities 
could not confirm whether those using the border area started them, they did not rule this 
possibility out.
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 In one case, police claimed that anything from ricocheting bullets, to 
welding machinery and campfires made by those trying to enter America could have caused 
the fires. More nefariously, smugglers have been accused of targeting remote border patrol 
sensors in order to destroy them and create a safe passage through the bush.
28
   
By using existing data on convictions for those professing a commitment to the ideas of the 
global jihad in America, it is possible to ascertain whether there is a relationship between 
areas where jihadists have been based and wildfires.
29
 Existing analyses of convictions for 
violent offences were cross-checked with media reports to confirm the details of where the 
individual was based at the time of arrest. This information is presented in Table 1, which sets 
out where convicted jihadists were based, and compares these figures with levels of wildfire 
occurrence. Before examining any relationship between the location of jihadists and wildfires, 
it is interesting to note that only seven (16%) of the planned attacks were outside the state 
where the individual lived. Clearly, US states vary enormously in size, however, this does 
seem to support the findings of the START study that most jihadists largely carry out 
operations relatively close to where they live.
30
  
- Table 1 about here - 
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Comparing the location of convicted jihadists and the incidence of wildfires, Table 1 
demonstrates that seven states have experienced both: California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Oregon, Texas and Washington. In total, 29 unexplained/human-caused fires occurred in 
these states from 2007-11. Whilst this is still a significant number of incidents spread over a 
substantial area, given the number of states that have seen jihadist convictions but no fire 
activity, these data seem to suggest the absence of any systematic relationship between 
jihadists’ home state and wildfires in the US.   
The final check available in attempting to ascertain whether jihadists were responsible for 
these fires, is to try and determine the relative risk of fire in the specific areas where the 
blazes occurred. If the fires had started in high-risk areas, it would support the conclusion that 
these events should not be regarded as particularly unusual or unexpected. Using monthly 
reports produced by the NICC and local government data which specified levels of fire risk, it 
was possible to identify the conditions in 24 out of the 29 regions where fires broke out over 
the five years.
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 These fires are classified using a scale from below normal, normal, to above 
normal. Of the 24 fires, 20 occurred in areas classed as having above normal fire potential, 
whilst four were normal. Although clearly not conclusive, this does seem to suggest that the 
vast majority of fires took place in contexts characterised by greater than average chance of 
fire. Of course, jihadists could have taken the opportunity presented by conditions which 
favoured fire activity in order to disguise their activities and set more devastating fires – a 
strategy which the guidelines for such attacks encourage. Similarly, due to the selection 
criteria used in this study, which focuses on more significant fires, favourable conditions for 
fire are likely to have caused larger conflagrations, meaning these results have perhaps merely 
confirmed the relationship between large fires and higher fire risk. However, given the very 
limited number of ways by which it is possible to identify whether or not fires were being 
started a) deliberately, and b) by jihadists, it seems possible to say, at the very least, that these 
data do not suggest that there have been particularly unusual or suspicious patterns of fires, or 
fires occurring where they might not otherwise be expected.  
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Whilst tentative, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of American 
wildfires. First, there appears to be no evidence that fires have been claimed by jihadists in 
the United States (although, of course, this is strictly speaking to be expected for popular 
resistance terrorism); second, there is little evidence of any systematic relationship between 
locations where jihadists are known to have been based and significant fire activity; and 
finally, there is little evidence to suggest there have been any particularly unusual patterns of 
large-scale fire activity which might plausibly be attributed to a terrorist campaign. In the 
next section attention turns to the European case to ascertain if there is any evidence for 
‘forest jihad’ across Europe.  
Wildfires in Europe 
For information on wildfires in Europe, the research used data provided by the European 
Commission’s European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS). EFFIS has produced 
annual reports on the scale, location and response to fires across most of Europe since 2000.
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As in the American case, the number of fires that have occurred across Europe is significant, 
running into the hundreds of thousands. To narrow the search, two criteria were used. First, 
attention was directed towards those countries most prone to fire: Spain, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, France; second, the scope of analysis was narrowed to focus on the last six years: 
2007-12. Official data are available for 2007-11, whilst media reporting was used for 2012, as 
official statistics have yet to be released. Although this is not likely to be as comprehensive as 
the data collected by the European Commission, it seemed important to try and ascertain 
whether there was any evidence of militant involvement in the fires that have afflicted Europe 
in 2012, not least, as there has been explicit concern that jihadists might have been implicated 
in these events.  
Looking first at the scale of the issue, the five countries under consideration have experienced 
approximately 50,000 fires from 2000-2011. In terms of terrorist attacks, the GTD identifies 
345 operations using incendiary devices over the same period. Of these, Greece has suffered 
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the highest number of arson attacks, accounting for 56% of such operations since the turn of 
the century. Unpicking these data a little further, whilst the perpetrators of the majority of 
these attacks remain unknown, Table 2 illustrates the distribution of attacks by the primary 
ideological claims of groups known or suspected of having caused specific incidents. As the 
Table shows, anarchist groups shoulder much of the responsibility, along with Basque 
separatist groups, and a handful of left-wing and animal rights groups, with a single arson 
attack suspected of being carried out by those in sympathy with Rwandan Hutus in London.  
- Table 2 about here - 
The vast majority of these attacks are concentrated in towns and cities rather than rural areas. 
Although not listed on the GTD, an exception to this trend was a group called the Kurdistan 
Freedom Falcons, reportedly linked to the PKK, which took responsibility for a number of 
forest fires in Turkey in 2006.
33
 Although there is nothing to suggest that jihadists are 
cooperating with Kurdish separatists, and whilst this is not the primary area of interest for the 
present purposes, it is interesting to note that setting fire to forests does seem to have been 
used as a method by contemporary militant groups beyond the Israel-Palestine context. 
However, it is important to remain aware that the Turkish Army has used forest fire as a 




Turning to media sources, searches of the electronic archives of major national newspapers in 
the countries of interest, supplemented by a search of Lexis Nexis, attempted to ascertain 
whether any links were reported between wildfires and jihadist militants.
35
 In general, the data 
did not provide sufficient information to identify the cause of most fires. Where wildfires 
were reported, there was little further detail on the cause of the blaze, focusing mainly on 
their aftereffects, and with little longer-term follow up of cases where arson was suspected. 
The only specific report suggesting jihadist involvement in fire-setting was made by analysts 
at Balkan Analysis, a news and research organisation covering the region. In this case, 
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Ioannis Michaletos and Christopher Deliso quote an anonymous Greek intelligence officer 
who claimed that a Saudi citizen was arrested in possession of a device similar to that 
believed to have started a forest fire in Greece.
36
 Furthermore, it was claimed that the device 
was similar to one used in the Madrid train bombings, which allowed the perpetrator to 
trigger the mechanism via mobile phone. Although interesting, there has been no further 
verification of these claims, limiting any conclusions it is possible to draw. Following the 
same approach as in the American case, the next stage of the research looked to see whether 
there was a relationship between fires and areas where jihadists have been arrested.  
Data limitations meant that the analysis of European fires was somewhat more constrained 
than that of the American wildfires. Annual EFFIS reports do not list individual incidents, 
instead offering aggregate figures for the number of fires in each country. Equally, reports of 
levels of fire risk per geographical area were not as detailed, making it difficult to consistently 
identify whether areas where wildfires had occurred were at increased fire risk. Similarly, 
interpreting any possible relationship between wildfires and geographical areas that had seen 
jihadist activity was less straightforward. However, the EFFIS reports do provide some 
information on the regions where fires occurred, making it possible to cross-reference this 
information with the locations of jihadist arrests.  
Again drawing on existing databases, in particular those compiled by Petter Nesser, who has 
catalogued all jihadist plots, plans and attacks across Europe since 2000, it was possible to 
determine that 19 operations had been reported in Spain, France and Italy, whilst no 
operations were reported as having taken place in Portugal or Greece.
37
 The next stage 
involved examining the relationship between larger fires, defined by the European 
Commission as those over 500 hectares, and the locations where jihadists were arrested from 
2007-2012. Conviction data drawn from Nesser’s analysis was cross-checked with media 
reporting to identify, as far as possible, the locations where those arrested were based. Table 3 
sets out the results of this analysis across the relevant regions and highlights overlaps between 
areas where jihadists have been arrested and significant wildfires. It is not possible however, 
18 
to state the number of fires occurring in each region, as EFFIS data lists aggregate numbers of 
fires only. The overall number of fires in each of these regions is detailed as being between 1 
and 200.  
- Table 3 about here - 
As the Table demonstrates, there were arrests in seven of the 16 areas where there had been 
significant fires, with Spain demonstrating the most consistent pattern of jihadist activity and 
wildfires. However, there were similar numbers of wildfires in most of the regions across 
Spain over the years of analysis, so it is very difficult to say whether or not there is a 
relationship between the two phenomena. Beyond this, there is little evidence for a systematic 
relationship between areas where jihadists were arrested and large-scale fires, with France 
entirely absent of wildfires in relevant regions, and only one area in Italy highlighted.  
Interestingly, there is some information on the level of fire risk in 2007 when a significant fire 
near Naples occurred. At the time, most of the country was deemed at high risk of wildfire, 
including the Campania region (which includes Naples). Indeed, Italy suffered large-scale 
fires across most regions in 2007, a substantial number of which were identified as arson 
attacks in the EFFIS report; 76% in Campania alone.
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 Although there has been limited 
analysis of the causes of fires in Europe, via a Delphi procedure, Raffaella Lovreglio and 
colleagues examined this question in Italy in more detail.
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 They found that their expert panel 
attributed most fires in Campania to negligence, for example stubble burning, whilst arson 
was far less widely recorded as a possible cause. Where deliberate fire-setting was listed, the 
main reason given was for seasonal workers trying to retain employment. Nowhere in 
Lovreglio et al.’s analysis were terrorist motives suggested. As such, there seems little or no 
evidence either that jihadists are taking credit for setting wildfires in these European 
countries, or that experts believe this to be the cause, at least in Italy.  
Conclusion 
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In conclusion, it seems there is little substantive evidence to suggest that jihadists are carrying 
out acts of ‘forest jihad’ in the United States or in those Western European countries most 
prone to wildfires. This research has certainly found no evidence that jihadists within Europe 
or the US have claimed responsibility for such attacks – although as already observed, in 
strict examples of popular resistance terrorism such claims may not be expected anyway. 
Further, there is also no evidence to suggest that there is any systematic relationship between 
wildfire activity and areas where known jihadists have been based. Finally, in general, the 
research found no large-scale wildfires in areas which were not considered at some risk of fire 
due to climate and conditions on the ground. Of course, as stressed throughout the paper, the 
data and methods available are somewhat limited. However, given the lack of systematic 
analysis to date, and the increasing attention paid to the question of ‘forest jihad’, this 
represents a necessary and important response to whether or not ‘popular resistance terrorism’ 
is a real phenomenon, and offers the most comprehensive test of the thesis to date.  
Moreover, as observed at the outset, the ostensible strategic purpose of forest jihad seems to 
require that it not be a merely occasional activity, merging indistinguishably into the existing 
figures for forest fires, but that it represent a meaningful economic cost for the countries in 
which it takes place. If this is indeed what jihadist ideologues are hoping for in calling for 
attacks of this sort, the evidence presented in this paper amply shows that they have failed.  
From this observation, two possible sets of conclusions may be drawn, each of which would 
appear to have interesting implications for our understanding of jihadism, and its on-going 
development.  
The first possibility is that the primary purpose of exhortations to acts of popular resistance 
terrorism is what it appears to be – that is, to propose actions which stand a reasonable chance 
of actually being performed. If this is so, then it would seem that the authors of jihadist 
propaganda publications such as Inspire have quite seriously misunderstood their audience. 
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Compared to other possible forms of jihadist attack, the advantages of forest fires would seem 
to be as follows. 
In addition to the relatively low practical costs involved, forest fires offer perpetrators a 
relatively risk free way of contributing to the jihad. All things being equal, they stand a better 
chance of escaping, offering more opportunities to carry out further attacks, or return to 
normal life. Indeed, al-Suri seems to recognise the potential attractions of this type of 
operation when he argues that such ‘civil resistance action’ allows the mujahid to “practice 
individual jihad on his land, where he lives and resides, without the jihad costing him the 
hardship of traveling, migrating, and moving to where direct jihad is possible”.40 Such a 
model also therefore promises a less arduous way of contributing to the jihad, with 
comparatively lower chances of interdiction. Because security monitoring is likely to be 
significantly lower in the wilderness than at targets in urban centres or surrounding critical 
infrastructure, there is less chance of being caught surveilling or carrying out an attack. 
Moreover, as there is no inherent need to source specialist components, the perpetrator is less 
likely to be identified when gathering the necessary materiel.  
Against these relatively low costs and barriers to entry, there would seem to be three potential 
(subjectively constructed) benefits to starting forest fires from the individual point of view. 
First, assuming that causing economic and environmental damage to the enemy is seen as a 
good in itself, forest fires seem to offer a lot of ‘bang for the buck’. To quote the opening 
words of Inspire 9’s article on firebombing:  
On December 2002 and in the south of Australia, flames of fire cause the eruption of 
79 conflagrations in New South Wales, it spread to its environs. There were more 
than 4,500 firefighters struggling to stop fires burning. Those crews were even 
backed up with helicopters’ support. It is considered the worst event of wild fires 
during 30 years. 19 houses were damaged at first and then, the fire went towards 
Sydney city where a firestorm erupted. It burnt down more than 500 houses. In that 
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Second, whether or not it is witnessed by the public, the jihadist who starts a forest fire is 
supposed to believe that God is watching with approval. To quote again the same article: 
Ask for the assistance of Allah. It is the most important step of all in the operation of 
jihad, as Allah is the one who facilitates the suitable circumstances and times. He – 
glorified is He above all – is the one who orders the fire to burn and to spread, and 
also to stop.
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Third (and not mentioned explicitly) it seems plausible to speculate that a conceivable 
positive inducement could be the sheer excitement and (if done in a group) sense of 
camaraderie likely to be engendered by a campaign of illegal, underground sabotage against 
the unbelieving power. Indeed, a possible latent motivation for groups such as Al Qa’ida in 
the Arabian Peninsula in trying to instigate campaigns of this sort could be the possibility of 
creating such low threshold campaigns as a behavioural stepping-stone towards higher-risk 
and more visible actions.  
What the absence of this phenomenon in Western countries would appear to show is that, 
whatever the (no doubt heterogeneous) incentive structures are that account for jihadists’ 
choices of target and operation, they are not these. In other words, those jihadists who do 
move to physical action are not deterred by concerns about taking human life or about 
personal safety; or to put it differently, those with similar sympathies who are so constrained 
are seldom if ever attracted by lower-cost alternatives. This would in turn seem to imply one 
of two things. Either there is something discontinuous about the process of disinhibition 
towards violence in jihadist cases, or the positive inducements that might lead people to take 
up popular resistance actions such as forest jihad do not provide a subjectively sufficient 
motivation – as opposed, perhaps, to the moral meaning and notoriety that come from more 
conventional forms of terrorism.  
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This leads in turn to the second point that the absence of a forest fire jihad seems to raise: the 
question of why such attacks are proposed in the first place. As noted above, one possibility is 
simply that organisations like Al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula do not have a sufficient 
understanding of their audience to know what sorts of action they will be attracted to. This 
could be because – as noted above – ‘forest jihad’ has actually been practiced in the Middle 
East. Alternatively, it could be that propagandists are simply trying everything blindly in the 
hope that something will catch on. There is, however, another possibility (not mutually 
exclusive with the one above), which is that calls for jihadists to involve themselves in 
causing disasters that happen anyway like forest fires, gas explosions and road accidents is 
simply an attempt to create spurious fears in Western countries about a hidden jihadist hand 
behind the occasional carnage of everyday life. If so, it may be worth asking whether methods 
of this sort need to be analysed as a radical repertoire in their own right.  
This paper’s evaluation of the prevalence of a possible form of ‘popular resistance terrorism’ 
has on the one hand offered a relatively straightforward, if necessarily limited test of an 
important and intriguing hypothesis. On the other, it has suggested something interesting 
about how and why violence emerges as it does from particular radical environments. That 
jihadists in the West choose not to carry out operations such as ‘forest jihad’ and appear more 
interested in carrying out operations which are more lethal, more ambitious, and more risky 
than is strictly necessary to fulfil the obligations of the jihad, demands an explanation. There 
is much further work to do in answering this question. This paper perhaps offers one 
parameter which might help inform a cogent response. Specifically, that there appears to be a 
lower threshold with respect to the actions Western jihadists are motivated to commit. This is 
a reminder to look beyond simple cost-benefit calculations and revaluate how best to 
understand targeting and tactical preferences. The conclusions this paper draws represent an 
invitation to look again at how to interpret individual decisions to move towards action are 
made and ask by what measures, and influenced by what factors jihadists choose to practise 
violence in the way they have done to date.  
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